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Abstract 
The Personal Status Code became law in Tunisia in 1956, revolutionizing gender 
law and relationships. This law, development programs and nationalization 
pushed by President Habib Bourguiba, and modernization and globalization 
significantly altered the state of Tunisian marriage and gender relationships. Prior 
to the Personal Status Code, the basis of marriage in Tunisia was the preservation 
of family relationships, status, and finances. Throughout the last half century, it 
has evolved from a family-based endeavor to a partnership between two people, 
as the individual has simultaneously replaced the family and tribe as the main 
actor in society. These changes are reflected prominently in the marriages of 
women which have taken place in the last three generations. This paper focuses 
on the experiences of three generations of women in the Hidri-Khelifa family—
Kheira, the oldest generation, her daughter Radhia, and her granddaughter, 
Maryam. Their generational experiences and opinions on all aspects of 
marriage—weddings, divorces, family planning, ideals in a partner, education, 
among others—are telling of the generational gaps which persist in Tunisian 
society. Kheira’s traditional and conservative values espouse her generation’s 
beliefs about the necessity of gender roles; Maryam reflects modern beliefs and 
actions; Radhia is somewhere in the middle, with modern ideals while the 
practicalities of her life reflect more traditional understandings of gender 
relationships within marriage. Their experiences reflect upon the nature of the 
changes in Tunisian society since independence and are telling of the Tunisian 
woman’s experience throughout that same time period. 
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Introduction 
As I conducted my interviews for this research project, I asked Kheira Hidri, one of 
my primary research subjects, if she had anything additional to add before we concluded the 
interview. She asked if I am married, and I responded that no, at the age of 20, I consider 
myself to be too young for that. She looked at me and solemnly wished that I would “soon be 
married to a good man,” adding that “20 is a good age for marriage and to have children.” 
Kheira’s perceptions of appropriate marriage reflect upon the experiences of her time, born 
into an era before extensive women’s rights and modernization in Tunisia.  
Throughout three generations Tunisia has undergone significant sociopolitical 
changes encompassing many aspects of modernity. With Independence in 1956 came new 
laws, notably the body of legislation which is the Personal Status Code, encouraging and 
demanding gender equality. In addition, the fledgling Tunisian government’s emphasis of 
development and nationalism contributed to the new attitudes which many Tunisians 
exhibited towards gender relationships. Many of these changes are espoused by the women of 
the Hidri-Khelifa family, the prominent research subjects of this paper, a family based in the 
suburbs to the west of Tunis, and the shifts in their ideologies regarding marriage and family 
relationships throughout generations. Kheira, as a member of this family’s oldest generation, 
represents traditional ideals and practices within her life and marriage. Her daughter Radhia 
espouses a mix of modern and traditional ideals but the practicalities and realities of her life 
mean that she finds those modern ideals somewhat in jeopardy. Her experiences within 
society and marriage often include traditional gender roles while she expresses modern 
ideologies about marriage and relationships. Maryam both exhibits significant modern ideals 
and sees them practically throughout her day-to-day life and within her marriage. 
Generational gaps exist among the Hidri-Khelifa women based on educational experience, 
Conover-Crockett 2 
 
rising social class, and ideologies. The experiences, ideologies, and anecdotes of these three 
women through marriage exemplify the social changes which have taken place in a 
modernizing, globalizing Tunisia since Independence. 
A growing shift towards modernity in Tunisia has contributed to an increasing change 
in gender roles. Marriage patterns no longer reflect family needs but rather the needs and 
desires of the individual and a changing relationship between the individual and society. 
Changing social and political atmospheres in Tunisia are closely related to patterns, trends, 
and opinions of marriage on a generational level, and those generational gaps are also telling 
about general social history of Tunisia. Marriage, as a basic tenet of the human experience, 
mirrors other elements of social history and thus is a telling picture of the situation of the 
Tunisian social experience throughout time. This paper’s exploration of the parallel narratives 
of family history and national social history intends to illuminate the trends of society 
towards a more modernized, educated, and independent community. 
Chapter 1 of this paper will cover the historical background of marriage patterns in 
Tunisia leading up to the time of Independence. It will discuss the Ottoman and French 
periods in which patrilineal family connections and endogamous marriage were common. In 
addition, it will explore the beginnings of changing gender roles with the writings of Tahar 
Al-Haddad.   
Chapter 2 will look at the political and social aspects of marriage in Tunisia, 
especially focusing on the changes made by Habib Bourguiba and the Personal Status Code. 
It will also explore social movements such as the Jasmine Revolution and wide-spread social 
changes such as family planning, divorce, and rising education levels, and will look 
throughout each of these threads at the Hidri-Khelifa women’s opinions and histories. 
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Chapter 3 will delve into the family unit of the Hidri-Khelifa women, focusing on 
their shifting perceptions of how they should interact with one another and with their spouses. 
It will explore spousal selection, weddings, and post-marriage extended family relationships. 
Methodology and Limitations 
As the purpose of this paper was to explore the relationship between individual family 
history and social history on a broader scale, the primary research method I employed for this 
paper was through in-person interviews conducted on November 13, 2015 near Tunis. For the 
purposes of this research monograph, in-person interviews were conducted with three 
generations of the Hidri-Khelifa family of the Tunis, Tunisia area. Primarily consulted were 
Kheira Hidri, her daughter Radhia Hidri-Khelifa, and her daughter Maryam Khelifa. Also 
interviewed was Ghaada Khelifa, the younger sister of Maryam. Consent to use names and 
quotes was obtained verbally on a recording by myself, and extensive typed notes were taken 
at the time of the interview, also by myself. Interviews were conducted in English and 
Modern Standard Arabic. One prominent limitation to this project was my language skills, 
which are unfortunately limited to Modern Standard Arabic and English, eliminating the 
opportunity to gain nuance from words spoken to me during interviews in French and 
especially in Tounsi. Of note is that Maryam Khelifa assisted in translation from Tunisian 
Arabic to English or to Modern Standard Arabic. Potentially this causes bias in that all 
translations from interviews of Radhia and Kheira were translated by another interviewee, 
though she was the only person capable of providing such translation at the time.  
In addition, secondary research was conducted through the Donald B. Watt SIT 
Library and the Kenyon College Library and Information Services. The Center for Maghreb 
Studies in Tunis (CEMAT) was a planned resource for this project but was unfortunately not 
open when I went to visit. In addition, following the November 24, 2015 terrorist attack on 
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downtown Tunis, we were advised to avoid the area and thus I was unable to visit CEMAT 
before the deadline for this independent study project.  
Other potential biases in the writing of this paper are personal biases, as I recognize 
that my own perspective places me as an outsider with only 3 months of experience living in 
a Tunisian family at the time of writing. In addition, I recognize that my own understanding 
of the functionality of a family is through the lens of my own family experience. I also 
recognize that my academic perspectives have been shaped through my past studies of 
history, modernization, and globalization. As such, to the best of my ability I have been 
aware of those biases as I wrote this paper. 
Chapter 1: Historical Background  
A main tenet of traditional Tunisian society was the extent of the role which the 
extended family played in a person’s life. Extremely often, endogamous marriage ensured 
continuing familial connections. Certain families maintained continuous control over power 
at local, regional, and national levels through a system of marrying their daughters for 
political connections. This practice extended from the most powerful Ottoman rulers and 
promulgated the majority of Tunisian households, leading to vast family networks at all 
levels of society. French colonizers, who came from their own patriarchal lineages, 
maintained and extended the patrilineal influences which were prominent on Tunisian 
society. Extended family networks organized along male lines controlled significant amounts 
of power until changes were made after independence in 1956.  
Family politics were important in Tunisia from the time of the Ottomans, when the 
concept of the royal family was especially prominent, both in Turkey and more locally 
among the beys, the extended branches of Turkish rule in Tunisia. Murad Bey, who founded 
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the Tunisian branch of the Ottoman dynasty and ruled from 1613 until his death in 1631, used 
a series of marriage alliances to cement his place within Tunisian society and ensure 
legitimacy despite his status as a former slave from Corsica and a convert to Islam.1Muradite 
power came to an end in 1702, when Ibrahim al-Sharif took power, but Sharif recognized that 
the best method to ensure peace and to legitimize his rule was through the preservation of 
marriage ties. As such, he married Mabruka, the daughter of a prominent Tunisian shaykh 
who had also been the wife of the two previous beys.2 Marriage alliances became the bedrock 
of Ottoman legitimacy in Tunisia. Because Ottoman power was centralized so far away in 
Anatolia, it was essential for the beys to have established local power backing them up. The 
shaykh’s willingness, for example, to marry his daughter to the beys legitimized their power, 
and the new dynasty of al-Sharif rode on that same perceived legitimacy by marrying the 
same woman who had her roots in local religious andMuradite power. In addition, these 
marriage alliances were economic deals for the beys—women would have owned and 
inherited property, including“agricultural estates; farms growing olives, grapes, and figs; and 
residential and commercial properties, including coffee houses, a mill, and a bakery.”3 
Women could therefore be used to transfer goods and properties to their husbands and were 
as such served as bartering tools for their fathers. Tunisian Ottoman society also politicized 
divorce, which was used to sever political relationships with fathers-in-law. When ‘Ali Pasha 
had an argument with his father-in-law, he faked a dispute with his wife, Hafisa, and sent her 
home to her father’s (his uncle’s) house. As such, that family tie was severed.4 High-status 
women were proxies for family disputes and their marriages were primarily political and 
economic in nature. 
                                                     
1Amy AisenKallander, Women, Gender, and the Palace Households in Ottoman Tunisia. (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 2013), 39. 
2Ibid.,40. 
3Ibid.,41. 
4Ibid.,45. 
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The nature of patrilineal rule and patriarchal power evolved further with the beginning 
of French rule. French colonialism in Tunisia began in about 1881 in the form of a 
protectorate as the bey cut off his relationship with the Ottomans and began to serve the 
French. The French came into Tunisia with their own theoretical ideas about patrilineal rule 
of society, which heightened the power of men within Tunisian society to levels which had 
previously not existed. The French protectorate portrayed itself as a paternalistic father figure 
which contained family to the private sphere and even feminized local male political figures. 
As such, women were doubly subjected by French policies.5 The French also cut off 
daughters who had been born through a matrilineal line from the colonial payroll as members 
of the bey’s family, delegitimizing women’s roles within the government of the protectorate.6 
Another aspect of French colonialism was the continuation of a policy of viewing the state as 
a familial entity, an idea which was strongly pushed by the beys, especially Ali Bey.7 French 
politics within the Tunisian state primarily recognized patrilineal lines and played into the 
previously existing patriarchal aspects of ruling society.  
 Marriage also acted as a political tool in ensuring the legitimization of family lines 
outside of those involved in centralized political power. In provincial areas family ties were 
particularly important during the several hundred years leading up to independence, 
especially if those specific families had religious prominence. In the village of SidiAmeur in 
the Sahel, descendants of the Sufi Saint SidiAmeur had access to more resources than other 
villagers through the habus, or the “land and property endowed to saints and their religious 
lodges.”8 Through their wealth from these resources and by legitimizing themselves through 
their ancestry to a saint, SidiAmeur’s descendants also increased their political power. A 
                                                     
5Kallander, Women, Gender, and the Palace Households in Ottoman Tunisia,171. 
6Ibid.,168. 
7Ibid.,169. 
8 Nadia Abu Zahra, “The Tunisian Personal Status Code, National Policy and the Homogenization of the 
Population,” Cambridge Anthropology 16, no.2 (1992), 41. 
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system of endogamous marriage formed in which descendants of saints would only 
intermarry with people of similar stature and wealth, and therefore a ruling class descended 
from holy people formed.9 Endogamous marriage ensured the longevity of social class 
structures.  
Before independence from Ottoman and French rule several systems of family 
dynamics existed in Tunisia which affected a broader tract of society, including those without 
significant wealth or political power. One such system was classic patriarchy, which is 
roughly described as the system in which young brides are on the “bottom rung of the gender-
age hierarchy, subordinated to both men and older women, primarily their mothers-in-law” 
and then increase their status within the household by increasing the number of men in the 
family—through production of sons, they gain status and eventually rule over their own 
daughters-in-law.10 Although many women lived in such a system at some point in their lives, 
classic patriarchy often was challenged by daughters-in-law and therefore cannot be found 
applicable to all situations.11 In general, however, the principles of the ruling families were 
applicable to all Tunisians—marriage enabled the cementing of social ties and helped to meet 
the needs of the family as a whole; people being married often had very little say in choosing 
their partners:  
 “The traditional Tunisian family was socially "central" in so far as the greater part of 
social dynamics were centered on it. Objectively, the major articulations of society 
were the lineages. The state was formed by one of these lineages, and the group 
tended to be organized like a family. For the individual, the family was the group to 
which he owed his life, his identity, and his social legitimacy; it was the outlet for his 
needs and the mediator, if not the sphere of application, of his values. On the 
symbolic level, it appeared as the most pregnant model of social relationships; 
"patriarchalism" thus became a form of social relations going far beyond the domestic 
institutions from which it derived its name. In this way, when the individual 
                                                     
9 Ibid. 
10 Martin Latrielle and Michael Verdon, “Wives against mothers: women's power and household dynamics in 
rural Tunisia,” Journal of Family History 32, no.1 (2007), 67-68. 
11Ibid., 69. 
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considered the world outside his domestic group, everything referred him back to the 
family and to his family.”12 
Before independence, Tunisian society relied broadly on the concept of the family and 
the tenets of tribalism and classism, to the point in which even governing bodies were 
organized as such. After independence the massive changes which took place in the 
restructuring and functionality of marriage were incredibly significant in that they changed 
the political system on the local and national level as well as significant aspects of social life 
in Tunisia. Tunisia’s shift from traditional to modern can be viewed through a theoretical lens 
as well as a practical one. Modernization theory, which was based on the assumption of 
certain conceptual beliefs such as the idea that tradition evolves into female-inclusive 
modernity, emerged in the 1950’s as a prominent school of thought.13 This doctrine included 
the idea that“modernization would be emancipatory for women as industrialization, 
technology and modern values would undermine the patriarchy of traditional society giving 
women increased access to economic resources.”14 Traditional societies worldwide tend to be 
“if not strictly patriarchal, at least vigorously male dominated”15 and “…[contrast] the world 
of family, mother, and household with the modern world of markets, technology, and 
science.”16 Before independence, Tunisia was strongly entrenched in a traditional sphere in 
which classic patriarchy ruled lives and kept women to a domestic sphere. 
Changes to society came slowly before independence, but voices to alter gender roles 
and existing marriage norms did exist. In 1930, Tahar al-Haddad published a book called Our 
Women in Sharia and Society, which focused on the need to alter family and personal law, 
                                                     
12 Carmel Camilleri, “Modernity and the Family in Tunisia,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 29, no. 3 
(1967), 591. 
13 Catherine V. Scott,Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory, (Boulder, 
CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 25. 
14DebnarayanSarkar, “Development Theory and Gendered Approach to Development: some theoretical issues in 
the Third World’s perspective,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive,Centre for Economic Studies, 
Department of Economics, Presidency College, Kolkata, 2006, 9-10. 
15 Quoted by Scott, Gender and Development,26. 
16 Scott, Gender and Development, 32. 
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rejecting the veil, seclusion of women, and polygyny. Although his book ultimately made 
him a pariah in his society at his time, he strongly influenced later reforms in family and 
gender law.17 Al-Haddad’s book had two primary focuses, to criticize the traditional Islamic 
legislative fiqh rulings, which he saw as frequently unnecessarily opposed to women, and to 
elevate the social status of women within all aspects of their daily lives, including the 
abolition of polygamy and legal freedoms akin to those of men, including equal inheritance. 
He saw the Qur’an’s allotment of higher amounts of inheritance to men as a sign of its time 
and believed that the spirit of the Qur’an would give equal inheritance to all.18 Despite vast 
criticism for his beliefs on women’s equality, Al-Haddad’s work would later be used in a 
significant way in the drafting of gender equality legislation.  
The end of colonialism left Tunisia, as well as other North African states, as a series 
of fragmented groups stuck together without significant commonalities between them.19 The 
prominence of tribalism in Tunisia had not been lessened by colonial rule and thus the 
inheritors of Tunisian political rule had to learn how to manage a splintered country. Clifford 
Geertz writes of “primordial attachments,” which draw from the “givens of social existence,” 
which include “immediate contiguity and kin connection.”20 These connections, still 
prominent in Tunisia in 1956, encouraged new president Habib Bourguiba’s efforts to make 
changes in Tunisian society on a basic level. In addition, new Tunisia faced the problem that 
industrialization had taken place already, and thus her new government had to encourage a 
plan of development in tandem with forming a new state and government.21 In order to create 
                                                     
17MouniraCharrad. States and Women’s Rights: The Makings of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 216. 
18Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Justice, Equality and Muslim Family Laws: New Ideas, New Prospects,” in Gender and 
Equality in Muslim Family Law: justice and ethics in the Islamic legal tradition, ed. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, 
Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen, and Christian Moe, (London: I.B. Taurius, 2013), 14-15. 
19Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 17. 
20 Cited by Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 18. 
21Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 20. 
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the sort of national unity and development which he desired, Bourguiba determined a need to 
alter society in a more cohesive and nationalistic matter. As such, Tunisia was unique among 
countries in the Maghreb in that the new government refused to allow the contributions of 
existing tribal structures to state-building.22 In part, this was because they ran counter to 
Bourguiba’s plan for development; but also importantly, tribes and religious establishments 
had primarily supported Bourguiba’s opponent, Ben Youssef, in the fight for power around 
the time of independence and as such were disenfranchised by the new state.23 
Forces of classic patriarchy, tribalism, and endogamous marriage were prominent in 
the time before Independence. It would take Habib Bourguiba’s efforts, combined with forces 
of modernity and shifting social tides, to change the status of women from economic and 
social currency for their families to independent actors. 
Chapter 2: Personal Status Code and Legal Gender Relations 
When asked whether they would consider themselves to be conservative or modern, 
Kheira stated that she considers herself to be conservative, and Radhia and Maryam described 
themselves as modern.24 Shifts from traditional Tunisian society to a new modernity 
accompanied the new independent state in a significant way. The new nation of Tunisia, led 
initially by Bourguiba, had to determine how it would interact with its citizens and the kind 
of citizenry it wanted to promote. For Bourguiba, unity and development were especially 
important. In addition to state-run initiatives to develop and modernize, society progressed in 
a distinctly Tunisian way, developing from a mold of a traditional Tunisian community to a 
modern one. This modern community, and its microcosm in the family is progressive in its 
own way, distinct of ideas of progressiveness in Europe and the United States but rather in 
                                                     
22Ibid., 201. 
23Ibid., 210. 
24Kheira Hidri, Radhia Khelifa, Maryam Khelifa, interviews by author, Tunis, November 13, 2015. 
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the context of a Tunisian past. This new modernity also brought with it significant changes in 
the relationship between the individual and society, shifting from the focal point being the 
family structure to a new focal point of the individual. Within the context of marriage, this 
emphasis transitioned towards the married couple as the nucleus of the relationship from the 
extended family. Kheira, Radhia, and Maryam represent the social change which was 
initiated by the Tunisian state and which was prominent in shaping alterations in Tunisian 
society and are clear examples of changes toward the prominence of the individuals.  
One particularly prominent method in which Bourguiba attempted—and succeeded, to 
a broad extent—in changing society to suit his goals of development and unity was through 
the Personal Status Code, a series of legal codes intended to abolish polygamy, give equal 
rights to women and men in the case of divorce, prevent forced marriage of minors, change 
the legal age of marriage, allow Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, change 
inheritance laws to protect the rights of women, give mothers and fathers equal guardian 
rights, and provide for education for boys and girls.25 Overall, this law intended to heighten 
women’s rights in Tunisia, but also Bourguiba saw that it had other possible benefits towards 
his national program of development. The introduction of the Personal Status Code in 1956 
was, for Bourguiba, a way to unite a country which was stratified based on tribal and class-
based ties.  
Another such way in which Bourguiba promoted the limitation of marriage based on 
tribe was through discouraging marriage from within the same village. According to Nadia 
Abu Zahra, he personally encouraged people from wealthier and more influential villages to 
marry people from their less enfranchised neighbors in order to break down tribal and family 
                                                     
25AmalFahem, “The Radical Transition,” Women of Tunisia, http://womenoftunisia.weebly.com/the-radical-
transition.html (accessed November 27, 2015). 
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allegiances and therefore to encourage the implementation of his end goal—an identity based 
entirely on being Tunisian and not based on tribalism.26 He said in a speech that: 
I heard that, in some villages, people find it distasteful to conclude marriage alliances 
between villages. This would be the case, for example, between KalaaKebira and 
KalaaSeghira, Raf-Raf, Msaken. People in these villages, convinced of their own 
superiority, would see it as condescending to marry someone from a neighboring 
village… in Monastir, someone does not give his daughter in marriage to…a man 
from Boudher or Kenius…I urge fathers  and mothers to avoid as much possible 
marriages among people of the same blood…These marriages, which are made with 
the greedy objective of preserving the patrimony of the kin group from strangers, 
produce in the long run children who are deformed and retarded. It is necessary to 
revive the line by marrying outsiders.27 
Bourguiba’s words here were likely intended to result in a fear reaction, through 
which he encouraged his ultimate goal—to eliminate tribal and family ties of marriage. 
Essentially the Personal Status Code broke down the aforementioned systems of endogamous 
marriage in which certain people were excluded from political and social power because of 
their lack of familial connections. It is often written that Bourguiba’s intention in creating the 
Personal Status Code was to emancipate women, but it appears that that was not his only 
desire. His ability to control identity through encouraging intermarriage between clans and 
classes was profound. It is notable that Bourguiba passed the Personal Status Code in 1956—
a full three years before the adoption of the Constitution in 1959. Bourguiba’s desire for a 
unified nationalistic country is emphasized by his early push for the Personal Status Code.28 
Encouraging intermarriage between tribes and classes for Bourguiba was a particularly potent 
way to enhance his ideologies.  
In particular, the Personal Status Code’s inclusion of a clause requiring consent 
encouraged this practice of intermarriage—family heads no longer had the right to force their 
daughters into politically based marriages—and the inclusions of clauses supporting women’s 
                                                     
26 Abu Zahra, “Tunisian Personal Status Code,” 42. 
27Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 221. 
28 Abu Zahra, “Tunisian Personal Status Code,” 42. 
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rights to divorce at their will and abolishing polygyny.29 The Personal Status Code made 
illegal the practice of accusing a bride of not being a virgin on her wedding night; therefore 
ensuring her fundamental human rights.30 Sons also benefitted from this change in the 
Personal Status Code; often they had been pushed into marriages with their cousins and now 
also had the opportunity to reject marriage matches as proposed by their parents.31 Personal 
autonomy as it related to selection of marriage partners was particularly important for 
Bourguiba, who stated in a speech that: 
It is inadmissible, I am sorry to say, that parents constrain their son to marry a young 
woman chosen for their own convenience. We have in this respect strange practices. 
There are the young women who have been “promised” to a young man for a long 
time, there are female cousins, the female relatives with various degrees of kinship 
closeness, a whole series of young women to marry off…Let’s leave the decision to 
those that the marriage concerns first: the husband and wife to be.32 
Bourguiba’s emphasis on the importance of personal choice—and his ability to sway 
people to recognize this—were significantly important in the context of societal change. 
Although it may be that Bourguiba and his government felt that they had to make changes 
pushing against the will of the people, the fact that people acquiesced so quickly to new 
systems of women’s rights and marriage law shows that society had, in fact, progressed since 
the time of Tahar Al-Haddad, in which he was ostracized from society. Although Bourguiba 
used force in some cases to implement his new laws, the fact of the matter is that he was able 
to make certain changes relatively quickly. One such example of this is that the Zaytuna, 
Tunisia’s center of religious learning, was willing to begrudgingly accept the validity of the 
                                                     
29Ibid., 42-43. 
30Ibid., 49. 
31Ibid., 48. 
32Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 221. 
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Personal Status Code despite their strong rejection of Al-Haddad’s work only a quarter 
century earlier in 1930.33 
The feminist aspects of the Personal Status Code can, in a way, be considered to be a 
part of a de-genderization of Tunisian society. A feminist-led theory of modernity and 
development, Gender and Development (GAD), is described as follows  
A more detailed examination of the roots of women’s subordination was done through 
the analysis of the global working of capitalism in combination with patriarchy. 
Processes linking different parts of the global economy like migration and tourism 
were examined in gendered terms (Mies, 1986). Analysis at different levels were used 
requiring an examination of the role played by the sexual division of labor and the 
links between the spheres of production and reproduction in the subordinate of 
women (Edholm et al, 1977). In the Third World context, concept of reproduction and 
domestic labor were observed to take on particular meaning: household is often a 
productive as well as reproductive unit and peasant households and poor households 
in urban areas are often producing for subsistence and the market. Greater emphasis 
was placed on the household, the role of gender relations within it and the link 
between the household as an economic unit and the global economy.34 
Gender and Development theory provides a view of modernity from the lens of 
women who work externally from the home and therefore no longer views the home or 
workplace as an inherently gendered space. The Personal Status Code can be seen as a 
method of degendering society; Bourguiba’s recognition of the necessity of women in the 
development of the country rewrote the traditional patrilineal narratives and included women 
in national dialogues and laws. In that sense, the household and women’s experiences became 
a legitimized sector of Tunisian society on a broad level for the first time.   
Despite Bourguiba’s portrayal of himself as the liberator of women—his self-
designed mausoleum doors proclaim that he was the “the great builder of the new Tunis and 
the freer of women”35—he was still following to some extent in the footsteps of the Ottomans 
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and French in their paternalistic views of marriage and women. His decision to implement 
feminism was undoubtedly an authoritarian one, and there was no significant women’s 
movement backing up his decision. One can note with some irony that women had no role in 
providing for themselves these new freedoms provided by the Personal Status Code. 
A particularly important aspect of the Personal Status Code was the introduction of 
equal divorce. Kheira has a negative view of divorce, and believes that after marriage couples 
should work through any crises together and find solutions to carry on within the 
relationship.36 Radhia sees divorce as a solution, and believes that if the couple is not 
compatible, divorce is an option. However, she also noted that women in society may face 
problems of being judged by society, although in her eyes men do not have the same 
experience after divorce.37 Radhia differs here from her mother in that she believes that 
divorce is acceptable in cases of compatibility, but also differs from Maryam, who says that 
she does not “conceive marriage without love,” and therefore that when there is no love there 
should be divorce, including if there are children in the relationship.38 This differs from 
Radhia’s beliefs about the acceptability of divorce in that Maryam considers that love is the 
most important part of a marriage, whereas Radhia focuses primarily on compatibility and the 
eyes of society. Maryam therefore views divorce, as well as marriage, as much more of an 
experience between two people while Radhia sees the relationship between the couple and 
society as important. The relationship between the individual and society has changed 
throughout time, with Maryam’s beliefs evolving from those of her mother and grandmother 
towards a greater emphasis on individuality.  
                                                     
36Kheira Hidri, interview with author, Tunis, November 13, 2015. 
37Radhia Khelifa, interview with author,Tunis, November 13, 2015. 
38Maryam Khelifa, interview with author, Tunis,November 13, 2015. 
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 Another element of Bourguiba-era development came in the form of emphasis on 
family planning in Tunisia to encourage population control. His development plans centered 
around the idea of having a limited number of citizens in order to prevent social issues such 
as lack of healthcare and higher education levels. This population control came through the 
emphasis of birth control, the legalization of abortion, and other such tactics, and in part 
contributed to changes in values, norms, and attitudes, including gender and equality 
concepts.39 Along with Bourguiba’s development plan, increasing modernity also contributed 
to desires on the behalf of young people to have smaller families.40 Because of these two 
factors, since the time of Independence, birth control has been widely and increasingly 
available to Tunisian women. In Tunisia in 1991, 50% of married women used some form of 
family planning; 21.9% of those had an IUD and 11.5% used oral contraceptives.41 In 
particular, these figures have been rising since 1978, when the percentage of women who had 
access to family planning was only 31%; in 2011 it was 62%; in 2015, after the Revolution, it 
was estimated that 95% of women had access to some form of birth control.42 Results of a 
1995 study showed that, as levels of education rose, the number of children born to a woman 
decreased.43 However, on a certain level, women with all levels of education had access to 
birth control. All of the Hidri-Khelifa women have used birth control for family planning 
purposes—Kheira used an IUD and then changed to pills, Radhia uses an IUD, and Maryam 
uses pills.44 Tunisia in fact is one of the few developing countries in the world where uses of 
                                                     
39HafedhChekir, “Youth at the Center of Social Change—A New Paradigm,” Lecture, SIT Study Abroad 
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Abstract. 
42HafedhChekir, “A New Paradigm,” 5 Oct 2015. 
43 Castro Martin, “Women’s Education and Fertility,” 189. 
44Kheira Hidri, Radhia Khelifa, Maryam Khelifa, interviews, November 13, 2015. 
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contraceptives among less-educated women match the rates of use among their more-
educated counterparts.45 
 Another commonly cited aspect of Bourguiba and Ben Ali-era development is the 
increasingly secular nature of the country. Although Tunisia is undeniably a Muslim country 
where to this day a moderate Islamist party, Ennahdha, is able to hold a fairly significant 
portion of the parliament, “most Tunisians feel that their country has achieved what few 
Arab/Muslim countries have managed to do, namely to create a genuine, authentic modernity 
that is not a copy of the Occident.”46 In fact, many Tunisian Muslims do not see that Islam is 
at odds with modernity. However, Tunisia as a country itself is primarily secular, and many 
people choose to practice religion in private rather than in public or official spaces. This has 
manifested through state actions and through people’s personal choices about their marital 
institutions. The state often would hold greater control over the conservative than the modern; 
its intended banning of the hijab from public spaces, which it viewed as inherently traditional, 
is a prime example of this. Banning the hijab was a symbolic statement taken by the 
Bourguiba and Zine El AbidineBen Ali (Bourguiba’s successor as president) regimes to state 
that women are modernized and therefore unoppressed.47 Only after the Revolution was the 
hijab allowed back into the public sphere. This aspect of the government’s image of itself—
as an inherently modernizing institution—long played into its narratives of secularization and 
development. In addition, after Bourguiba, people began to view aspects of their personal 
lives which connected with the state as inherently civil rather than being religion. The 
growing secularization of Tunisia transitioned from political rhetoric to the way in which 
people viewed themselves in relation to the state and religion. This secularization is 
                                                     
45 Castro Martin, “Women’s Education and Fertility,” 195. 
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evidenced by the Hidri-Khelifa women’s views on the nature of their marriage. While 
Kheira’s marriage was religious, Radhia and Maryam had marriages which were entirely civil 
and did not involve a mosque.48 After the Revolution, both Islamist and secularist groups 
have emphasized the need to help disadvantaged women to become self-sufficient within 
their communities.49 As such, there has been an opening of feminist rhetoric to allow Islamist 
groups to take a seat at the table of feminist organizing. Still, many women view their 
marriages as civil and not religious. 
Another element introduced by the Personal Status Code is equal education. 
Throughout the years, views of the importance of education have remained roughly the same, 
though the reasoning behind the necessity has changed along with the actual amount of 
education which Tunisian women have had. The Hidri-Khelifa women are a prime example 
of the modifications of women’s education throughout the years. Kheira, who has no 
education, Radhia, who completed twelfth grade, and Maryam, who is one year from 
finishing a Ph.D. in Design at Tunisia’s prestigious Manouba University, represent the 
upward educational mobility of many Tunisian families of their times. Kheira spoke about 
education in marriage as being important for financial stability, as “the woman and man must 
finish their education to help each other because life is difficult now…the women must help. 
In the past the man used to work alone but now it is not financially possible.”50 Maryam’s 
views differ significantly from Kheira’s, showing a generational gap in beliefs of why 
education is important. “For me, it’s important to have the same level of education. To have 
the same ambitions and the same thoughts—to have some harmony in the couple.”51 
Maryam’s belief that equality of education is important for equitable marriage is similar to 
                                                     
48Kheira Hidri, Radhia Khelifa, Maryam Khelifa, interviews, November 13, 2015. 
49 Gray, “Quests for Women’s Rights,” 294. 
50Kheira Hidri, interview, November 13, 2015. 
51Maryam Khelifa, interview, November 13, 2015. 
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her beliefs in the requirement of emotional stability and support as a role of marriage—
harmony is important in marriage for her, and educational harmony is no exception. This 
counters her grandmother’s beliefs that education is beneficial for the purposes of financial 
gain.  
A particularly interesting aspect of the Personal Status Code is its effect on women 
based particularly on their educational levels. MouniraCharrad’s interview with Ahmed 
Mestiri, the Minister of Justice in 1956, shows the Bourguiba administration’s attitude toward 
the Personal Status Code. He stated that “the law was in advance of the society.”52 That being 
said, women experienced—and continue to experience—the Personal Status Code in very 
different manners based on their levels of education. Radhia and Maryam, both of whom had 
experienced fairly significant levels of education, praised the Personal Status Code. Radhia 
noted that it has been a source of emancipation for women, encouraging them to participate in 
society, to work, and to live their lives freely.53 Maryam described it as “our pride because 
the wife has the same rights as the husband; she can even divorce him and that doesn’t exist 
in some Arab countries.”54 Her sister Ghaada called it emancipatory.55 However, Kheira was 
not familiar with or aware of the Personal Status Code, even after Maryam explained its 
tenets for her.56 The Personal Status Code, while technically affecting all Tunisian women, is 
not practically accessible by all of them. If women do not know their rights, they cannot 
assert them in the face of any discrimination which befalls them. Kheira, who was born in 
1939, was 17 years old and recently married at the time the Personal Status Code was 
adopted as Tunisian law and therefore should have been the target demographic of the law. 
Kheira’s inability to assert her legal rights completely due to her lack of knowledge of those 
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most basic rights points to the idea that, despite Bourguiba’s claims that women were 
emancipated after the adoption, the Personal Status Code related only to a certain set of elite 
women. Lack of knowledge of rights easily leads to a violation of those rights. If Kheira, a 
woman who has lived in Tunisia for all of her life, from the time of independence to the time 
post-revolution, and yet does not know the details or even of the existence of the law, it is 
evident that the workings of the law primarily affect more educated women. For those 
women aware of the law, like Maryam, Ghaada, and Radhia, it is the pride of Tunisia. But 
this pride does not extend broadly to all women.  
Laws such as the Personal Status Code accompanied modernity and the social 
changes which complement it—the creation of new social classes, including business and 
professional groups. Part of this manifested in a desire behalf the part of young people to 
make their own decisions regarding their marriages—as Tunisians modernized, so too they 
began to want to experience liberty in their daily lives.57 As Sarah Grosso points out, it is 
impossible to ignore the fact that the law has impact on society.58 Women born into this new 
society after the Personal Status Code’s implementation experienced significant changes from 
the lives of their mothers and daughters. These changes included educational, intellectual, 
ideological, environmental, and economic factors. Women with higher rates of education also 
got married at later ages59—this was accompanied by rising levels of education in general. In 
Tunisia in 1975 11% of marriages involved women ages 15-19 but by 2011 it was only 1%.60 
Women were delaying marriage and therefore devoting more time to engaging with society in 
different ways under Bourguiba’s new development plan. A distinctly Tunisian form of 
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modernization was taking place in which certain traditional values remained but gained 
certain autonomies and freedoms.  
In 1969, anthropologist Barbara Larson observed in the Tunisian village of al-Qarya, 
in western Tunisia near the Algerian border, that “formal organizations of national 
government…have been implanted in the village and perform the bulk of al-Qarya’s 
administrative and service functions” but that in general the extended family unit was the 
most basic and functional part of society.61 Thus by the late 1960’s Bourguiba’s plan to 
nationalize had clearly succeeded on a political level. Larson observed that people physically 
lived near their family members based on patrilineal lines, but also noted that patrilineal kin 
did not “beyond the range of siblings jointly own or control land or economic 
resources…solve disputes, arrange marriages, offer hospitality, deliberate on family or 
village matters, or act as agents of social control” and that  
even though the two saints’ shrines in the village are maintained by the saints’ 
descendants, the latter gain neither substantial wealth nor special esteem as a result. 
Rather, wealth, status, and esteem rise and fall quite rapidly depending on the merits 
and luck of individuals, not groups, and accrue to individual households, not to kin 
groups as a whole.62 
The differences between Larson’s experiences in al-Qarya and Abu Zahra’s writings about 
SidiAmeur mentioned in the previous chapter are obvious—political and social activities had 
been restructured to the extent that even those who used to wield remarkable power in 
society, including the descendants of the shaykhs, were no longer considered as particularly 
prominent in society. As such, only a bit more than ten years after the Personal Status Code’s 
implementation and Bourguiba’s efforts to nationalize and eliminate clanship ties, it is clear 
that even in the most remote villages these changes had begun to take effect. Marriage was no 
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longer an effective tool to harness and control power within Tunisia and therefore had 
evolved into a much more personalized, independent part of people’s lives.  
Reforms came to the Personal Status Code in 1993 by Ben Ali, who changed some of 
the law to focus more specifically on the married couple rather than extended family. These 
reforms included the banning of domestic violence and giving mothers significant rights to 
veto forced marriage of their daughters.63 This continues to represent changes which took 
place in Tunisian society as it moved in a progressive fashion—laws no longer emphasized 
the extended families and the married couple took the forefront of society’s structural needs. 
Laws typically address social needs from their times, and as such it is clear that Ben Ali’s 
emphasis on changing laws to focus on individual married couples rather than extended 
family relations is significant. Society had changed to the extent that Ben Ali no longer felt 
the need to work towards development from the same perspective as Bourguiba did—gone 
were the days of discouraging endogamous marriage, and instead the marriage between two 
individuals became the center of conversation. In addition, Ben Ali changed the Personal 
Status Code in 1998 to assist children born out of wedlock and in 2007 the marriage age was 
legally set at 18.64 In addition, post-Revolution, the law has been changed to allow women to 
travel with their children without the permission of their husbands.65 
The Jasmine Revolution came in Tunisia in 2011 full of significant hope for changes 
to be made not only in the political but social spheres. Radhia, however, saw that the 
Revolution had changed people’s ability to speak in public. Although she saw this as a 
positive in that people are no longer afraid, she noted that with it came disorder and lack of 
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respect for women, and that it is now more common for men in the street to jostle or harass 
women who participate in society.66 Maryam believes that society has not changed at all 
since the Revolution, 67 while Kheira sees that society has in fact changed for the better 
afterwards.68 This generational disagreement as to the Revolution’s success or failure reflects 
typical generational gaps in port-revolutionary Tunisian life; youth have continued to be 
excluded from the political process and politicians are distant from social issues which matter 
to young people, such as sexuality and marriage. For example, the average age for marriage is 
over 30 years of age now, and therefore there have been changes in views of sexuality before 
marriage (70% of young men and 50% of young women are sexually active before marriage). 
Young people want to discuss sexuality and to challenge taboos yet find themselves up 
against a wall by older politicians who refuse to have conversations about such things.69 As 
such, it is not surprising that Maryam feels pessimistic about changes which have happened 
while her grandmother and mother have a slightly more positive spin on its effects. All three 
women agreed that the state of marriage, especially in a legal sense, has not changed in 
Tunisia since the Revolution. This is largely due to the nature of realities about the Personal 
Status Code, namely that it is “a product of the historical compromise between ‘traditionalist’ 
and ‘modernist’ visions” and that it has become so integrated into the Tunisian mindset so as 
to feel, to many people, like an extension of the Constitution, especially by women.70 So, 
although society and gender relations have changed, but aside from a few small adjustments 
to the Code under Ben Ali, the political and legal aspects of marriage have remained 
unaltered. 
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From the days of Radhia’s youth to the days of Maryam’s, Tunisian society as a 
whole has evolved, accompanied by politics, from a fairly traditional society to a modern 
one. These transitions, represented by state-led initiatives like the Personal Status Code and 
social movements like rising levels of women’s education, have significantly changed the 
face of marriage in Tunisia. In general, younger generations have more education, more 
knowledge of their rights, and are delaying marriage. Yet the Revolution, a youth-led 
movement, has in effect failed the young people of Tunisia, who feel like they have been let 
down and left behind in the process. Youth are changing their own patterns, becoming more 
open to newer ideas about gender, sexuality, and marriage, and yet they are feeling stifled and 
left behind in the political sphere. Tunisia is at a crossroads in which its youth perceive a 
generational gap between themselves and their parents. This crossroads extends beyond the 
political and social spheres and into the world of the family. 
 
Chapter 3: Marriage, Gender, and the Family 
Bourguiba’s efforts to develop the country by decreasing the importance of clan and 
extended family ties significantly contributed to a growth in individual decision-making on 
the behalf of young women in Tunisia. Relationships between the individual and society have 
changed significantly—choice of spouses, intra-marriage decision-making, extended family 
relationships, and gender roles within marriage have shifted towards giving more privileges 
and power to the young women. Changing gender norms in Tunisia have significantly altered 
the ways in which Tunisians interact with one another and this is reflected throughout 
changing marriage patterns of the last half-century. In particular, marriage has transitioned 
from being a decision made by families to preserve their financial and social statuses to a 
commitment between two people for personal reasons. This is applicable to a variety of 
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important moments within marriage, from the decision to become engaged to the wedding 
and life as a married couple. Throughout three generations, the Hidri-Khelifa women have 
epitomized the transitions from traditional to modern, with Kheira’s beliefs and life firmly 
entrenched in what she describes as conservative, with Radhia’s beliefs in the modern sphere 
but some of the practicalities of her life remaining traditional, and with Maryam fully 
embracing a Tunisian modernity. In a sense, the Tunisian family’s changes over the last half-
century are a microcosm of the modifications which permeated Tunisian society as a whole. 
When it came time to choose a husband, Kheira, Radhia, and Maryam employed very 
different strategies. Kheira had known her husband, Mohammed Salah, since she was six 
years old. He was her paternal cousin who, after the death of his parents, had come to live 
with her family. Her father, who was dying, approached her in 1955 when she was 16 and 
asked if she would like to marry her cousin. She responded in the affirmative and that was the 
final decision—there were no further courtship rituals. Kheira mentioned that, for the time, 
the face that she had met her husband before marriage was atypical, and that the only reason 
she had known him beforehand was their family ties and that they had lived together for some 
time. At the same time, her two sisters married two of her husband’s brothers. Ultimately, 
Kheira’s family chose her husband for her and her two sisters for entirely economic 
reasons—as her father was dying, she needed to be attached to a man who could support 
her.71 Kheira’s choice in a husband represents a model in which her family made decisions 
for her, from a particularly economic standpoint. 
In a completely different method of choosing a spouse, Radhia met her husband, 
Yusuf, while they were both working as teachers in the same school. She began courting him, 
going on dates (such as for coffee), but problems arose when her father did not want her to go 
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out with him because he was “scared that he would lose her”, and so she continued to see him 
in secret. As such, she decided to marry him because of this—once her engagement was 
announced, her parents became more comfortable with the relationship and any issues with 
her relationship with her family were solved. Ultimately, Radhia’s decision of whom to 
marry was her choice, and she stated that her parents were “not involved” in choosing her 
husband.72 That being said, Radhia was influenced by growing rifts in her family and thus 
made the choice to transition from dating to marriage because of her family. It is clear that 
Radhia made her own decision to pursue a relationship with Yusuf but also the influence of 
her parents influenced her choice to become engaged. 
Maryam’s decision to marry her husband was entirely personal. She and her husband, 
Sefwan, dated for four years before becoming engaged, and had a two year engagement 
before their wedding. During part of their relationship, Sefwan was living in Monastir while 
Maryam lived in the Tunis area. However, they would travel to visit each other and engaged 
what Maryam described as typical dating activities, including swimming, drinking coffee, 
attending the cinema, and visiting local destinations such as SidiBou Said and La Marsa. 
Another interesting layer of her relationship with her husband is that it kindled over social 
media in a time in which social media was becoming particularly prominent within Tunisia. 
In 2011, 42% of Tunisians were on Facebook for a total of 4.6 million, and 62% of those 
were youth.73Sefwan was Maryam’s childhood friend until the ages of five and six, but she 
moved from Monastir and did not see him for 15 years. He contacted her on Facebook and 
the relationship evolved in person from there. When asked why she decided to marry him, 
Maryam said “I love him, simply.” Maryam described her decision to marry Sefwan as 
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“totally [her] choice” but mentioned that her family was supportive. However, Maryam also 
made it very clear that she only would marry after she was sure that her own ambitions would 
not be stifled through marriage. She took at least two years to decide to marry Sefwan 
because, as she says  
When I was a child, I didn’t want to get married. I wanted to be independent and free 
of any responsibility but when I met him my view changed. Here in Tunisia the 
woman has responsibility in the house—she cleans, she cooks, she does everything, 
that’s why I didn’t want to commit. My husband is different, he is not this kind of 
man and that’s why I accepted to marry him….It took time to believe that he is 
different.74 
Maryam’s determination to wait to marry until she was sure that she would be able to 
continue living her life as she chooses is an indicator of her break from traditional ideals of 
the marriage and family. Her decision was, as she described it, based entirely on the ideals of 
love and not out of desire to fulfil certain socially prescribed gender roles, such as to support 
herself economically as her grandmother did or to validate her relationship with Sefwan, as 
her mother had to do in order to maintain a good relationship with her parents. However, 
there still were some economic concerns in Maryam’s decision to get married. Although she 
waited to be sure that she would be able to continue living her own life as she chose, they 
decided not to become engaged for two additional years in order to wait until Sefwan had 
found a stable job.75 That being said, this is a different sort of economic concern from those 
experienced by her grandmother, who had to marry immediately for economic reasons—
Maryam and Sefwan chose to wait to marry. It is of note that both Maryam and her mother 
describe themselves as “modern” women while they have distinctly different views of the 
necessity of and reasons for marriage. The differences between each woman’s method of 
choosing her spouse reflect changing patterns within society as a whole, as were previously 
discussed. Tunisian society transitioned throughout the Bourguiba and Ben Ali periods 
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towards allotting women independence in choosing their partners and, with that, towards 
lessening the family’s role in choosing spouses. Kheira’s economically-based marriage was 
organized by her father, Radhia made her own choice but also respected the wishes of her 
family, and Maryam made a choice which was not only independent but was based on a 
determination to be able to continue living her own life as an individual within her marriage. 
Following selection of the spouse, Tunisian wedding ceremonies have altered 
significantly throughout time along with the marriages they begin. Kheira was not present at 
the religious aspect of her wedding ceremony, but, described her marriage as follows: 
I went from my family’s house to my husband’s house. Someone put me on his 
shoulder and carried me there from my house to his house. There were no cars in 
those days. That was all of the ceremony. The marriage in that time—the father of the 
husband sees a woman, goes to her father, says that he likes her daughter for his son. 
Then they do al-Fatiha and then they are married. It’s different from the marriage in 
our time now. The husband did not see the bride before the marriage, though it was 
different in my case because he was my cousin and we knew each other.76 
Radhia’s small ceremony did not include certain traditional aspects, including the henna 
party. Instead she had a small, European-style wedding in which she did not wear traditional 
clothing but opted for a white dress, and did not include a dowry of any kind.77 (See 
Appendix A). Maryam described that each night of a typical Tunisian wedding has its own 
taqoos, or traditions. Typically, a Tunisian wedding has several days’ worth of celebrations, 
including the henna nights, which last for three nights to make the lines dark. The traditional 
wedding ceremony itself consists of the joining of the bride and groom and a presentation of 
golden jewelry. Maryam wanted her wedding to be more simple, and so she only had three 
ceremonies—her henna night (although she only had one night rather than the typical three), 
her husband’s ceremony, and the one in which they came together and were officially 
married by the state. Her henna party was much more traditional, while her ceremony was 
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distinctly modern and included certain European-style components, such as tossing the 
bouquet78 (See Appendices B-F). Marriage ceremonies have simultaneously shifted from 
traditional—in that they are prominently a religious endeavor with fanfare depending on the 
economic status of the family—to modern—in which they are large, elaborate affairs which 
last several nights and incorporate globalized elements. 
After independence, Tunisian households also saw a shift in post-wedding marital 
relationships and a change of gender roles within the family and household. This is evidenced 
by anecdotes from the Hidri-Khelifa women. Throughout the years, a transition has occurred 
in which equality within the family has increased significantly. Kheira, who has three sons 
and two daughters (one of whom is Radhia), lives in a very traditional manner. Maryam 
described her grandmother’s role within her household as one firmly embedded in traditional 
gender roles: “she’s old but she does everything in the house—she cooks, cleans, everything. 
And my uncle’s wife had a baby two weeks ago and she’s taking care of the baby and the 
wife.”79 Radhia also mentioned that her father, Kheira’s husband, was the only one in the 
family who spent money on the household regardless of who earned it.80 Tunisian women 
historically did not spend money but this has changed in recent years, and now it is common 
for women to spend money rather than just their husbands, a result of increased consumerism 
and also of changing gender roles within the family.81 Kheira continues to live in a household 
which emphasizes the importance of traditional, patriarchal gender roles, as are emphasized 
by the aforementioned Gender and Development theory.  
In general, Radhia was more comfortable discussing her ideologies and beliefs about 
marriage and gender roles than talking about the specifics of her life, but she made several 
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comments about the nature of her role within the household which, combined with 
observations made about family life at the time of the interview, were telling of discord 
between her ideals and the practicalities of her life. Radhia and Yusuf have three daughters, 
Maryam (28), Azza, (26), and Ghaada (22). Radhia spoke about her ideals of how women 
and men should interact after marriage, saying that “parents should work together.”82 
However, a follow-up question wondering whether she and her husband shared the 
responsibilities of running a household and raising three daughters elicited the response 
“chweyachweya,” or “a little bit,” a subtle implication that she did not feel that she and her 
husband equally shared amounts of household work.83 When asked about the state of life for 
women in Tunisia in general, Radhia responded with the following: 
“In Tunis, the men don’t respect the women. They don’t respect that she is 
participating with them in everything—that she helps them in spending money and 
they have to help spending money. This is mostly in public, but also within my own 
life.They don’t respect that it’s a choice of the women to help them, but see that it’s 
her duty to do the work outside and in the home.”84 
Radhia’s experiences of gender roles have molded her life so that she feels that she 
has to complete the same amount of work outside of the home as men, but then to have 
significantly more work inside the home. These responses, along with observations of family 
life in Radhia’s home, contribute to the idea that the practicalities of her life do not match her 
ideologies about gender relationships within marriage. After I completed my interviews with 
Maryam and Radhia, I remained in the house for some time and made the following 
observations about family life. After my initial arrival, Yusuf welcomed me into the house. 
After the completion of the interviews, I sat in the living room to take down notes. I observed 
that Yusuf was in a sitting room watching television while Radhia and Maryam went to the 
                                                     
82Radhia Khelifa, interview, November 13, 2015. 
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84Ibid. 
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kitchen and then emerged to serve me coffee, juice, and dates. They then went upstairs, and 
Radhia returned after a few minutes to watch television with Yusuf. After some time, Yusuf 
rose and asked me if I needed anything, and I requested to be shown the bathroom. Although 
he was already standing and had been the one to ask me if I needed anything and Radhia was 
seated and watching television, he asked her to take me upstairs to show me to the bathroom. 
While Radhia spoke in idealistic terms about husbands and wives performing equivalent 
work within the family, the circumstances of her life and the nature of her position within her 
household mean that she ultimately performs more work within the context of the home. 
Radhia’s experiences fit in with criticism of neoliberal theory; one of its basic tenets is that 
modernity has de-gendered the workplace and it is often viewed as a theory which supports 
concepts of equality. Debnarayan Sarkar criticizes this theory because it “has been 
constructed on an equality impoverished view of women’s lives; it has defined women’s 
economic agency as equivalent to that of men, ignoring their greater embeddedness in 
familial and domestic responsibilities.”85 Although Radhia has found a space for herself in 
the workforce, as a teacher who in fact holds the same job as her husband, she has greater 
responsibilities in the home. 
Radhia’s experience is supported by writings by HafidhaChekir, Tunisian feminist 
and founder of the Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates (ATFD), which was one 
of the only independent women’s associations in Tunisia until the Revolution. She wrote in 
1996 of the need to continue making structural and societal changes within Tunisia. Despite 
the Personal Status Code, she saw a continuing need for the promotion of egalitarianism 
through an “approach [which] should be developed which would change the authority of the 
father to the authority of the parents, and the paternal responsibility of a parental 
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responsibility.”86 Both women who were married during Ben Ali’s rule and activists during 
the same period saw that on a societal level there was a crisis in which women were still 
subjected to traditional gender roles within the home. Likewise, Sarah Grosso’s 
anthropological research from late Ben Ali-era Tunisia found that middle-ages housewives 
noted that society expected them to engage with their families as homemakers.87 
Maryam was much more willing to discuss the specific details of gender roles within 
her marriage, which can be interpreted as such that she perceives less discord between her 
ideals and the specific details of her life. Maryam noted that she sometimes does more 
household work, but that is because Sefwan, who is a customs officer, often works at the time 
when cooking needs to be done. If Sefwan is not working, they cook together, and he usually 
washes the dishes after dinner. Maryam also noted that, because she is still working on her 
Ph.D., she has a more flexible schedule and thus does household work. Overall though, 
Maryam feels that she does a fair amount of household work. In addition, Maryam noted that 
at this point Sefwan pays for most of their household needs, but that she knows that will 
change once she completes her studies and then they will pay for everything together.88 As 
such, since Radhia’s marriage and HafidhaChekir’s writings about the necessity of gender 
role change, certain changes have been made to the structure of the millennial family. 
Maryam’s relationship with her husband reflects the drive she had in the time before she was 
married—her basic instincts in her relationship are to ensure that she will not lose her own 
autonomy and this includes being drawn into performing all of the household work. 
Along with the nationwide pattern of changing marital relationships came alterations 
in extended family relationships post-marriage. The importance of the family in an 
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individual’s life has changed in meaning throughout several generations. After her marriage, 
Kheira did not see her parents again. Her father passed away shortly after her wedding and 
her mother remarried, and she mentioned that she thought that “it was better not to have them 
in my life anymore.” Her husband had no family except for his brothers, and her family was 
not involved, so she and her husband essentially formed an entirely new family unit. 
However, Kheira did mention that her sister remained in her life as a babysitter when she 
began working.89 Larson’s research from the 1960’s shows a similar phenomenon in which 
women lose involvement with their families—she found that families in Tunisia were much 
more likely to interact with people on the father’s side than on the mother’s side.90 Kheira’s 
mother’s remarriage meant that she had been absorbed into a new patrilineal family just as 
Kheira and her sisters had been. Despite being a parent to her daughters, Kheira’s mother’s 
duty was to her new family. A change came later, represented by Radhia’s relationship with 
her family post-marriage which remained fairly steady. When her children were young, her 
mother watched them while she would work. In addition, she mentioned that her mother has 
remained a source of personal support for her—if she has problems with her husband, she 
speaks with her mother about them and receives advice about what to do.91 Maryam has 
remained close with her parents but ensures that her life is separate from theirs. She predicts 
that, if she has children, she will use her parents for babysitting as she would feel most 
comfortable leaving her children with either her parents or Sefwan’s. And at the time of the 
interview, Maryam was staying with her parents because her husband had an engagement 
with work for that time, and she “was afraid to spend nights alone” in their home. That being 
said, Maryam and Sefwan have made sure to ensure their privacy is kept within their 
marriage. Sefwan’s parents live in Monastir, and they go to visit them twice a month but 
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ensure their own personal space by staying in a separate studio apartment from his parents 
and making plans to go out as a couple. This increasing pattern of autonomy leads to more 
power and control within the relationship and family for women in Tunisia.92 
The mother-daughter relationship has evolved with time as an extension of changing 
values and norms. As generations progressed in time and level of education, images of an 
ideal mate for a daughter changed from describing a man who could be present for physical 
needs to emotional needs. Kheira in particular was more likely to look for a man able to 
physically care for her daughter, whereas Radhia and Maryam leaned towards describing 
emotionally supportive and affectionate men. Kheira’s primary concerns when picking a 
potential husband for her daughters were that he be “financially secure, [have] a house.” 
When pushed by Maryam, Kheira added that she would hope that he be “a good man who 
takes care of her.”93 In a shift from her mother’s economically-based concerns, Radhia said 
that she hoped her daughters would marry men who are “level-headed, not violent, and 
affectionate.”94 Maryam responded in a somewhat similar-vein, describing an ideal husband 
for a hypothetical daughter as “loving, attentive, sensitive, protective, and affectionate,” 
noting that she sees those qualities in her husband and that she would want her daughter to 
marry for the same reasons she married—love.95 For Kheira’s father and Kheira herself, 
economics were prominently important in desires for choosing a husband and for Radhia and 
Maryam, they were not. Women who have experienced higher levels of education are more 
likely to be able to get a well-paying career or make money on her own, and these 
experiences of self-sufficiency lead to beliefs that a daughter should not need to focus on 
economic concerns in her choice of a spouse.  In addition, this shows a shift in gender roles in 
                                                     
92Latrielle and Verdon, “Wives against mothers,” 78. 
93Kheira Hidri, interview, November 13, 2015. 
94Radhia Khelifa, interview, November 13, 2015. 
95Maryam Khelifa, interview, November 13, 2015. 
Conover-Crockett 35 
 
Tunisia—younger generations have more education and are thus more likely to be 
economically capable of caring for themselves.  
When asked about generational differences in views of marriage specifically within 
the context of their family, each woman saw some sort of gaps. Kheira spoke of seeing that 
there have been changes in the context of the wedding ceremony itself as well as the 
structures of choosing a spouse. In particular, a woman is now able to meet her husband prior 
to the ceremony—before, sometimes the man wouldn’t see his wife until after the ceremony 
had been completed, and she mentioned that the couple could potentially find each other 
“blind or paralyzed”.96 Radhia perceived that she views marriage differently from her mother 
and daughter for several reasons, entirely based on generational gaps—Kheira is older and 
therefore has older ideas, including about gender roles within the family—Kheira’s husband 
is the only one to spend money in the household—while Maryam has “young ideas” about 
the nature of relationships.97 Maryam herself noted that generational gaps about opinions on 
marriage exist between herself and her mother because women of her own generation are 
more likely to make their own choices about marriage whereas women of older generations 
were more likely to have the involvement of their families in that decision.98 
Generational differences as they relate to family dynamics are prominent in the Hidri-
Khelifa family.  Although Kheira did not have a significant amount of extended family, her 
life decisions continue to be strongly based on the needs of the family she does have. 
Radhia’s life decisions reflect respect of the family and traditional gender roles although her 
ideologies differ. Maryam was quick to emphasize that for her, individual choice was most 
important. Kheira, Radhia, and Maryam represent significant trends between generations in 
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Tunisia—increasing amounts of independence, less family control over a woman’s decision, 
and new desires in a partner. These elements are reflected both in how people actually choose 
partners and how they would want their daughters to choose their husbands. In all, these 
trends show changing gender relationships between husbands and wives and among the 
family. Generational gaps, as discussed in the previous chapter, are also relevant in exploring 
intra-family relationships, shaping opinions about how marriage should manifest.  
Conclusion 
Habib Bourguiba’s Personal Status Code sparked a bevy of changes in Tunisian law, 
particularly as relating to intergender relationships and marriage law. Along with other 
modernizing factors, the Personal Status Code also altered part of the makeup of Tunisian 
society. The Hidri-Khelifa women’s example displays the vast transitions which have taken 
place over the last sixty years. Kheira’s lack of knowledge of the Personal Status Code, her 
neutrality towards its ideas, and her decision to follow the traditions of her family can be seen 
as a representation of the patriarchal society from which she comes. It also make a bold 
statement about the nature of the Personal Status Code—it is beloved and honored by some 
while other women, like Kheira, cannot reap the benefits of its existence. Kheira’s beliefs are 
distinctly different from those of Radhia or Maryam, who were raised in a more modern and 
less patriarchal society. Tunisian lives, exemplified by the example of these women, have 
moved away from traditional patterns of relating with society—rather than through the 
family, people are independent actors participating in their communities. In particular, 
women are more active participants in choosing their own paths, ensuring that their 
relationships with their parents and spouses allow for flexibility for individual choice. 
Economic and educational transitions in Tunisia have contributed to this atmosphere of 
increasing individual choice; as educational levels rise, so too does socioeconomic class and 
Conover-Crockett 37 
 
also awareness about events and laws which affect the individual. The end of endogamous 
marriage and shifting gender roles contributed to the creation of new social classes and social 
mobility, and women have continued to rise through the Tunisian educational system rapidly.  
 And yet despite the broad evolution and modernization of society since Independence, 
Tunisia faces a new problem—bridging the generational gaps addressed in this paper to 
wholly incorporate young ideas and actions into the fold of today’s Tunisian politics and 
society. Youth feel shut out of government, and even after their Revolution in 2011 are often 
forced to submit to what they view as older ideas. As Tunisia moves forward into an 
increasingly globalized world, it is vital that youth, and women in particular, are continually 
drawn into the fold and that their ideas about life are accepted as part of Tunisian identity. 
Young women are making remarkable headway in independent choices about their lives, and 
encouraging their presence in debates about Tunisian society can only be beneficial to the 
nation. 
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